



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

NATURALISM AND AGNOSTICISM. *The Gifford Lectures*, delivered before the University of Aberdeen in the years 1896-98. By JAMES WARD, Sc.D., HON. LL.D., Edinburgh, Professor of Mental Philosophy and Logic in the University of Cambridge. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1899. 2 vols. Pp. xviii + 302; xiii + 294. \$4, *net*.

THIS is one of the most valuable books I have read for a long time; in its realization and statement of the precise contemporary problem, possibly the most valuable. Since his famous article "Psychology," in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Professor Ward has written so little that the present work has been anticipated with keen expectation—anticipation only increased by the author's record (unknown to the general public) in relation to theological matters, and by his sympathetic experience in the study of scientific questions, especially in their psychological and epistemological aspects. In most respects the "Gifford Lectures" altogether justify these hopes, and higher praise could hardly be given.

Accordant with the perspicuity and soberness of the entire presentation is the clearness with which the contents are set forth. They may be summarized as follows: (1) an introduction on the general standpoint of modern science, with special reference to its origins (lecture i); (2) a discussion of the mechanical theory—very fair, yet of exceeding rigor (entitled Part I, and embracing lectures ii-vi); (3) a criticism of evolution (*a*) in its mechanical and (*b*) in its biological forms (lectures vii-ix and lecture x, respectively, entitled Part II); here Mr. Spencer receives a tremendous castigation. So far Vol. I. (4) In Vol. II, a presentation and overthrow of the modern theory of psychophysical parallelism (entitled Part III, and including lectures xi-xiii); (5) a refutation of dualism (entitled Part IV, and including lectures xiv-xvii); (6) a conclusion, called spiritual monism, giving in bare outline Professor Ward's reconstruction of the results of contemporary inquiry (entitled Part V, and including lectures xviii-xx). It will be noted at once that, considering the space at his disposal, our author has covered the entire ground of fundamental problems, and

the division and selection have been so managed that this task has been accomplished with relative adequacy. Indeed, as regards the mechanical theory, in particular, the treatment may be taken as final. With respect to biological evolution and spiritual monism, especially the latter, I am not completely convinced, or even well satisfied; this, possibly, because Dr. Ward relies chiefly on epistemology where others would appeal to metaphysic.

A leading, as well as a most refreshing and valuable, characteristic of the investigation centers in its strong historical sense. The precise situation of speculative problems at the present moment is kept in view constantly, with the result that fruitful suggestion abounds everywhere. Dr. Ward sees plainly that the once importance of the natural sciences, strictly so called, has passed away, and that the raw material for immediate study must be sought in the newer group of biological and even semi-human sciences. Accordingly, his problem almost states itself. Given the mechanical theory, the theory of mechanical evolution, the theory of biological evolution, and the theory of psychological parallelism, the principal question is: What do the fundamental conceptions employed by each involve ultimately? By framing theories of the universe the sciences have *handed themselves* over to philosophy, for in science as such there need be nothing fundamental, and there is nothing ultimate.

As I have hinted already, Dr. Ward's criticism of the first, second, and fourth positions must be viewed as thoroughly successful. In other words, the mechanical theory, the theory of mechanical evolution, and the theory of psychological parallelism fail as accounts of the universe as a whole. They can be proved insufficient and abstract, or partisan and illogical. Or, to put the matter even more harshly, they imply conceptions which man—such is the actual constitution of his experience—cannot think. Further, because such “unknowables” are taken by some to be thinkable, they really lean upon elements which, although implicitly present, have not been explicitly recognized, and a recognition of them explodes theories that proceed as if these factors were non-existent. In illustration of this it may be said that the account of the manner in which the mechanical theory turns itself inside out in the inevitable course of its historical development is masterly to a degree, and the same may be allowed of the measure meted to the half-monisms associated with the “new” psychology. In the criticism of the theory of mechanical evolution the work rises to a very high level of dialectical skill, so much so that many might be

inclined to hold that Mr. Spencer receives too summary treatment. But others, no doubt, will reply that this writer cannot be too severely "shown up," and certainly Dr. Ward beats him to a pitiable rag. Indeed, the tone of pity, rather than the old familiar one of irritated contempt, furnishes an apposite indication of the direction in which philosophy is traveling now. Although Dr. Ward nowhere says so, he implies that Mr. Spencer was trained as an engineer, and has remained faithful to his original calling to the end. Consequently he has been so situated as never to have even come within sight of a philosophical problem; for, whatever the universe may be, it is assuredly not a more or less inefficient machine.

Three points may be selected for criticism, even although the work as a whole deserves and commands praise out of all proportion to any possible blame. (1) Dr. Ward, like so many psychologists, attaches supreme importance to the will. In his view conation must be regarded as a more fundamental fact of experience than cognition. It were truer to declare that the two are complementary; they cannot be separated, nor can one be aggrandized at the expense of the other in a normal experience. Of course, as everyone knows, in the period of philosophy just closed abstraction was made of the intellect. This happened to be a main vice of Hegel and his British pupils. A similar abstraction of will seems to be on the carpet now. One can trace it, for example, in the neo-Fichtian movement at Harvard, and here Dr. Ward appears to give it some countenance, even though he might reply that he does this chiefly by implication, and all the way through indicates the necessity of a psychic central unity. Better, however, amid some contemporary tendencies, to avoid even appearance of evil. (2) A more dangerous, because less evident, point is the stress laid, in the lecture on "Biological Evolution," upon "subjective selection," and the use made of it to favor neo-Lamarckism, as opposed to neo-Darwinism. While the attack on Weismann may be perfectly just—and certainly wins assent in its reference to this writer's multiplied metaphysics—one feels inclined to urge that, at the moment, enough has not been accomplished toward a philosophy of evolution to warrant the adoption of positions so decisive. Moreover, the remarks will most assuredly be misunderstood by professional biologists; indeed, they have been so misinterpreted already by a distinguished American expert. And, having regard to the office which this work is likely to perform for a better understanding between science and philosophy, I cannot help concluding that the line

adopted is unfortunate. It were greatly to be desired that Dr. Ward should take up the entire question of biological evolution in detail. The brevity of the present statement forms a main element in the trouble. (3) More fundamental than either of the foregoing are the inferences to which Dr. Ward has laid himself open respecting his constructive conclusions. Thanks to the insistence upon individual experience, and especially upon the peculiarity or self-intimacy of each man's psychological universe, this "spiritual monism" possesses not a few characteristics that render it suspiciously like monadism. Not that Dr. Ward represents a return to Leibniz, but one may be forgiven misgivings in regard to possible influence exerted by Lotze. Systematic thinking, in this country at least, has many reasons for dreading such an event. Be this as it may, several ultimate problems stand over for further treatment—the very interesting differentiation between the individual and the universal object, for example.

In conclusion, I should like to add that limits of space render it quite impossible to do even the scantiest justice to the most timely contribution to English philosophical literature since Mr. F. H. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. The work is one that ought to be *absorbed* by all who have to deal with religious problems, most emphatically by that large and increasing class who are nonplussed by the contemporary necessity for a resolute free thought which, despite its freedom, does not minimize one whit the vital importance of religion.

R. M. WENLEY.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,
Ann Arbor, Mich.

HEART OF MAN. By GEORGE EDWARD WOODBERRY. New York :
The Macmillan Co., 1899. Pp. 329. \$1.25.

THIS is not a book for the careless or unthoughtful, but it will repay an attentive reading. To the literary charm one expects from Professor Woodberry it adds the interest of deep problems of life and thought. The four papers in the volume are not related by chance, as their titles might suggest; they are embraced in a unity which is founded "deep in the general heart of men." The first, "Taormina," republished from *The Century*, makes the ancient Sicilian town a parable of the dealings of nature and man with man, and finds the woe wrought on him by his fellows worse than all the destructions of Etna. The essay abounds in profound observations on life and men, and is